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The Measure of Damages for Mineral
Trespass-A Kentucky Perspective
INTRODUCTION
Mineral trespass may be defined as the loss resulting from
the unauthorized taking of coal, oil, gas or other minerals from
the property of another.' Although there are several distinct
kinds of damage which may accompany a mineral trespass, 2 this
I Stiggar, The Mineral Trespasser: Willful v. Innocent, R-1, R-2, 12th Annual
Mineral Law Seminar, University of Kentucky Mineral Law Center (Oct. 1987).
An important distinction is drawn between a trespass and a situation involving a
cotenant who extracts minerals from the mineral estate he shares. A cotenant cannot be a
trespasser as against his cotenants since he has a lawful right to extract minerals from the
whole of the mineral estate in which the cotenancy exists. Taylor v. Bradford, 244 S.W.2d
482, 484 (Ky. 1951); see generally SHORT & THOMAS, 1 KENTUCKY MINERAL LAW § 13.03
(1986). However, a cotenant who mines without the consent of his cotenants must account
proportionally to his cotenants for the profits he has made. 244 S.W.2d at 484, 485.
There are several cases illustrating trespasses not involving the removal of minerals
which are still called mineral trespass. For example, if a person dumps sludge and other
refuse on the land of another, thereby preventing the owner of the mineral rights from
mining the minerals, this might be characterized as a mineral trespass. See Hi-Hat Elkhorn
Coal Co. v. Inland Steel Co., 370 F. 2d 117 (6th Cir. 1966). Or where someone hauls his
coal over land he does not have permission to use, this also may be called a mineral
trespass. See Kentucky Border Coal Co., Inc. v. Mullins, 504 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1973).
Also, if a person negligently rolls logs down a mountainside which strike and rupture a
gas pipeline, this might also be called a mineral trespass despite the fact that the trespasser
did not take the gas. See Lindsey v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1960). Finally, if one
were to store gas in an underground cavern, part of which was under the land of another,
such action has been called a mineral trespass in using the latter's land without paying for
such use. This kind of trespass action was first attempted in Hammonds v. Central
Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934), but the plaintiff lost because the
court held that since gas when reinjected reverts to its natural state, not owned by anyone
until recapture, there could be no trespass. 75 S.W.2d at 206. But Hammonds has been
recently overruled by a case holding that reinjected natural gas remains personal property.
Texas American Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25
(Ky. 1987). Therefore, it is possible that the cause of action attempted in Hammonds may
be a viable type of mineral trespass which does not involve converting minerals.
I For example, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for damage to the surface
of his land caused by the mining, such as damages caused by blasting. See generally 58
C.J.S. MINES AND MINERALS § 137(g) (1948); 54 AM. JuR. 2D MINES AND MINERALS § 220
(1971); Stiggar, supra note 1 at R-13, R-14.
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Note will specifically address only the loss of the minerals and
how that loss should be measured.'
The general rule regarding the measure of damages to com-
pensate for minerals taken by mineral trespass may be simply
stated-the measure of damages depends on whether the trespass
is willful4 or innocent.' If the trespass is willful, the mineral
owner will recover the full value of the mineral at the time of
its removal from his mineral estate. The trespasser's liability will
not be reduced by the costs incurred in removing the minerals.
6
On the other hand, if the trespass is innocent, the mineral owner
may recover only the value of the minerals in place (i.e. before
they are extracted), which in Kentucky is measured in terms of
the royalty the mineral owner would have received had he exe-
cuted a lease granting a lessee the right to produce the minerals.
7
The Kentucky rule in innocent trespass cases has been modified
in both the solid minerals' and oil and gas9 contexts when the
mineral owner is in a position personally to mine the minerals.10
In such cases, the mineral owner will recover the full value of
the extracted minerals less the costs incurred by the trespasser
in removing the minerals."
This Note will discuss the issues that arise upon application
of these general rules regarding damages for mineral trespass.
First, the meaning of "willful" and "innocent" will be dis-
cerned.12 Second, the historical background and current reason-
See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text. It should be noted that a plaintiff
could seek recovery for the wrongful taking of minerals by an action other than trespass,
such as conversion. Donas, REMEDIES § 5.2 (1973). "[Tlhere is often a choice between a
trespass to land theory and a conversion to chattels theory." Id. at 332. Conceptually the
form of action might affect the measure of damages. See Note, The Remedy by Damages
for Conversion Compared with that by Trespass, and by Replevin, 2 Uwiv. L. REv. 67
(1894-95). However, commentators and Kentucky courts agree that the name given the
cause of action does not affect the measure of damages. DoBBs, supra ("It is now generally
agreed that the choice of legal theory ought not to govern damages in these cases .. .
Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 262 S.W. 300, 303 (Ky. 1924).
4 See infra notes 16-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 16-38, 57-78 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 123-26, 135-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125-26, 135-36 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 16-78 and accompanying text.
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ing behind the different measures of damages will be explored.13
In particular, this Note will discuss the continuing validity of
the royalty measure of damages in cases of innocent trespass.'
4
Finally, the costs for which a trespasser, in at least some cases
of innocent trespass, will receive credit will be identified."'
I. THE WILLFUL-INNOCENT DICHOTOMY
Before the damages in a mineral trespass action may be
ascertained, the trial court must determine whether the trespass
was willful or innocent.' 6 Some authorities discuss this distinction
in terms of bad faith and good faith. 7 Regardless of which
terms are used, the line between the two opposites has not been
easy to draw.
The opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Swiss Oil
v. Hupp8 is perhaps "the best single treatment"' 9 of the willful-
innocent dichotomy. In Hupp,20 the court stated in conclusory
terms that a willful trespasser "knows he is wrong ' 21 whereas
an innocent trespasser "believes he is right." ' 22 These conclu-
sions, if taken literally, would be misleading; they are oversim-
plifications of an enormously complex determination.
23
The Hupp court, perhaps realizing the need for specific
guidance in determining whether a trespass is willful or innocent,
set forth the process for making that determination. The tres-
3 See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 159-87 and accompanying text.
16 Swiss Oil v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1039 (Ky. 1934). "[C]lassification as willful
or as innocent .. .is the hinge upon which [a] case hangs and upon which the decision
as to the extent of recovery must turn." Id.
,7 1 KuNTz, THE LAW OF On. AND GAS § 11.3 (1987); Sullivan, Good Faith of
Mineral Trespasser, 19 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 529 (1979); Comment, The Measure
of Damages for Unauthorized Production of Oil and Gas: The Role of Good and Bad
Faith, 15 TUL. L. REv. 291 (1940-41).
69 S.W.2d at 1037.
9 Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Ky. 1965).
69 S.W.2d at 1037.
21 69 S.W.2d at 1039.
2 Id.
3 See Stiggar, supra note 1 at R-3, R-4; see also infra notes 24-78 and accompanying
text; DoBBs, REMEDIES § 5.2 at 328-30 (1973).
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passer is presumed to have willfully trespassed.2 4 He has the
burden of proof and must rebut the presumption. 25 There are
certain factors to consider in deciding whether the trespasser has
overcome the presumption: (1) Was there "reasonable doubt of
the other party's (the mineral owner's) exclusive or dominant
right"2 6 to the minerals taken? If so, this will weigh in favor of
the trespass being innocent. 27 (2) Did the trespasser rely on "the
advice of reputable counsel"? 28 If such is the case, this will
indicate an innocent trespass. 29 (3) "[Tjhe fact that a court of
competent jurisdiction has rendered a favorable judgment"30
awarding title to the trespasser will be conclusive and will result
in a finding of innocent trespass.3 (4) What were the trespasser's
"sincerity and his actual intention at the time"32 of the trespass
- did he truly believe he had a legitimate claim to the minerals
he took?33 (5) The court must consider the nature of the mineral
taken. If it is oil or gas, the "fugacious nature ' 3 4 of such
minerals may justify their being taken, even though doubt exists
as to ownership, for fear that "delay would endanger loss and
action would seem to be urgent." 3 5 This list is by no means
exhaustive, 36 but it does contain the factors on which most cases
turn.37
69 S.W.2d at 1041; see also Kycoga Land Co. v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 110 F.
2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1940); Rudy v. Ellis, 236 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1951).
69 S.W.2d at 1041.
26 Id.
27 Id.
Id. An example of reasonable reliance would be such as where an attorney, after
fully considering the facts, renders an opinion for the trespasser leading him to believe he
has rights to the minerals. Id. at 1042.
19 Id at 1041, 1042.
10 Id. at 1042.
11 69 S.W.2d at 1042.
32 Id.
31 Id. at 1041; see also Loeb v. Conley, 169 S.W. 575 (Ky. 1914) (This factor is not
determined by the trespasser's own testimony, but instead by his actions at the time of the
trespass.).
, 69 S.W.2d at 1042.
35 Id.
36 It is beyond the scope of this Note to identify all the factors which could affect
the willful-innocent determination. Perhaps the most complete source of information in
this vein is Sullivan, Good Faith of Mineral Trespasser, 19 AM. JutR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D
529 (1979).
11 See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.
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Since findings of willfulness depend on the circumstances of
each case and will, therefore, turn on unique combinations of
the above discussed factors,3" it is beyond the scope of this Note
to hypothesize each case that would result in a finding of willful
or innocent trespass. Yet a working knowledge of this dichotomy
is necessary to fully understand the measure of damages for
mineral trespass. The discussion that follows will provide that
knowledge by briefly describing some of the fact situations in
the Kentucky cases leading to findings of willful and innocent
trespass.
A. Cases of Willful Trespass
Jim Thompson Coal Co. v. DentzelP9 is one of the earlier
cases finding a coal company liable for willful trespass. The
court in Dentzell identified two factors that indicated the will-
fulness of the trespass. The first was the defendant coal com-
pany's failure to keep track of its mining operation maps. These
maps were supposed to be used, at least in part, to insure that
the company did not mine too close to neighboring mineral
estates/ ° There was a statutorily imposed duty to refrain from
mining too close to property lines.4I The second factor was the
defendant coal company's actual notice that they were mining
the plaintiff's minerals. The coal company knew their blasting
operations below ground were centered above ground on plain-
tiff's land.
42
In Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Co. v. "Kentucky River Coal Corp.
(Elkhorn-Hazard),43 the defendants argued that they were inno-
cent trespassers because they allegedly had a lease contract to
38 See generally Swiss Oil v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934); Loeb v. Conley, 169
S.W. 575 (Ky. 1914).
19 287 S.W. 548 (Ky. 1926).
, Id. at 549.
4 Id. Today, KY. REV. STAT. § 352.490 (Bobbs/Merril 1983) [hereinafter K.R.S.]
provides that persons engaged in underground mining may not mine within 25 feet of the
line dividing his mineral estate from that of another without first getting the permission
of the latter and the Commissioner of Mining. If he fails to do this, he will be liable for
any damages caused by the unauthorized mining. K.R.S. § 352.490.
32 287 S.W. at 549.
41 20 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1927).
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produce the minerals they had taken." The court held that the
defendants were willful trespassers because they failed to meet
their burden of proof on the issue of the existence of the con-
tract, 45 and even if they had met that burden, they were in
breach of the contract's purported terms.
46
In Sandlin v. Webb 47 the court ruled that it may be a willful
trespass for trespassers to purposefully or recklessly fail to de-
termine the boundaries of their mineral rights. 48 Clearly, in the
context of mineral trespass, ignorance is not bliss.
4 9
Finally, as Harlan Gas Coal Co. v. Hensley ° and Elk-Horn
Coal Corp. v. Anderson Coal Co.5 illustrate, since a trespasser
has the burden of proof to overcome a presumption that the
trespass is willful, 2 he may be found to be a willful trespasser
simply because he fails to meet that burden.53 In other words,
the plaintiff does not have to prove any facts, such as those
found persuasive in the cases discussed here, indicating willful-
ness. It is incumbent upon the defendant to prove he is an
innocent trespasser.
From the foregoing, one should realize that the term willful,
as used in the context of mineral trespass, is not exactly in line
with the meaning that term is generally assigned.14 The term not
only embodies the concept of willful conduct but also includes
- Id. at 68.
45 Id.
- Id.
240 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1951).
" Id. at 70.
49 Id.; see also Griffith v. Clark Mfg. Co. 279 S.W. 971 (Ky. 1926). The court states
that "[olne is presumed to have intended the reasonable and natural consequences of his
acts." 279 S.W. at 972. Where persons fail to make a simple measurement which would
have clearly shown they were not on their own land, that failure can evince recklessness
or wantonness which can be considered a willful trespass. 270 S.W. at 971, 972.
28 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1930).
223 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Ky. 1963).
52 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
" 28 S.W.2d at 6; 233 F. Supp. at 750. Some of the trespasses in Anderson Coal
Co. were found to be innocent because of a court decision mistakenly affirming the
trespasser's rights to the minerals in a certain parcel of land. But the trespassers went past
even this disputed land onto another parcel, and it was this trespass that was found to be
willful due to lack of evidence to the contrary. 233 F. Supp. at 750.
1 Willful is defined as "[procecding from a conscious motion of the will; voluntary.
Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; not accidental or
involuntary." BLACK's LAW DicTnoNARY 1434 (5th ed. 1979).
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what can fairly be described as reckless conduct" and gross
negligence .6
B. Cases of Innocent Trespass
In cases of innocent trespass the trespasser must reasonably
believe he has title to the minerals he is taking. 7 For example,
if a court has determined that the trespasser owns the mineral
rights in question, and he thereafter mines the minerals only
later to have the court decision overturned and the title deter-
mined to be in someone else, he will be an innocent trespasser
because he reasonably believed at the time of the trespass that
he had title to the minerals he took. 8 Another example of this
general principal is Rudy v. Ellis. 9 In that case, the trespasser
was mining under a lease that purportedly entitled him to take
the minerals in question but subsequently was declared invalid.
6°
In those circumstances, the trespass was found to be innocent.
6'
Note that Rudy is different from the Elkhorn-Hazard62 case in
that in Rudy the contract definitely existed; therefore, reliance
on it to provide a claim of title was more reasonable.
63
One might argue that a "reasonable belief" in having title
is too indefinite a standard, despite the apparent common sense
applications of the standard discussed in the preceding para-
graph. The case of Kycoga Land Co. v. Kentucky River Coal
Co. 6 may serve to validate that argument. In Kycoga, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying Kentucky
law, held that the defendant trespasser was clearly negligent in
failing to discover the proper boundaries of his mineral rights.
65
" See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text; see also Stiggar, supra note 1 at R-
4. "Any discussion of an innocent trespass presupposes that the trespasser entered under
color of title. . . . There can be no innocent trespass where the trespasser knows that he
has no title." Stiggar, supra note 1 at R-4.
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92, 21 A.L.R. 2D 373 (Ky. 1950).
236 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1951).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
61 236 S.W.2d at 468.
" 110 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1940).
61 Id. at 896, 897.
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Nevertheless, the court held that the trespass was innocent,
stating that "mere negligence" is not inconsistent with an in-
nocent trespass. 66 One must wonder whether a trespasser can
have a reasonable belief in his title when he has made little or
no attempt to determine whether he had any title to the minerals
taken. The Kycoga case may fairly be characterized as drawing
the outer limits of an innocent trespass; it clearly illustrates that
"innocent" is a misnomer. 67 One should note, however, that
Kycoga involved the application of a now-repealed criminal stat-
ute that imposed fines and double damages for a willful tres-
pass. 6 The result might not be the same today since the courts
interpret terms used in criminal statutes more narrowly than they
might interpret the same terms in the common law civil context.
69
One reason courts may be inclined to find a trespass to be
innocent is the confused state of title in mineral producing areas.
It is apparently common to have legal title vested in someone
other than the owner of record. 70 This fact justifies finding an
innocent trespass in cases where the trespasser has a reasonable
claim to title regardless of the state of record title. 7' As one
author stated, "[it is painfully obvious that the mineral operator
is particularly vulnerable to defects in his title and the title of
his lessor." 7 2 The courts are not blind to this problem. In Kycoga
the court recognized "that in the uncertain condition of land
rights in that mountainous section of the state there might be
infirmities in the lessor's title." 7 The problem is also reflected
by cases like Lebow v. Cameron,74 where the court makes it
clear that the constructive notice provided by the actual owner's
recorded deed does not affect the willfulness of the trespass.
Even with actual notice of the true owner's claim, the trespasser
Id.
6, Innocent means "[fIree from guilt; acting in good fatih and without knowledge
of incriminatory circumstances, or of defects or objections." BLACK's LAW DlCTIONARY
708 (5th ed. 1979).
110 F.2d at 896.
0 See Com. v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 350 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1961).
70 See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
1, See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
72 Stiggar, supra note I at R-2.
13 110 F.2d at 897.
74 394 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965).
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can have a reasonable belief that he has title to the minerals.75
Surely the difficulty in determining title to mineral rights
should be a factor in deciding whether a trespass is innocent,
but it should not be used as an excuse. Justice Montgomery,
dissenting in Lebow v. Cameron7 6 advised the court that a
trespasser should not be allowed to rely on the fallibility of
record title. Instead, that fallibility should give rise to a duty on
the part of the trespasser to make even further inquiry such as
talking to the record title holder in a good faith attempt to
ascertain who really owns the mineral rights. 77 Justice Montgo-
mery opined that an innocent trespasser was an inadvertant one,





Early English common law did not distinguish between a
willful and an innocent trespasser in measuring damages. 79 In all
cases of mineral trespass, the trespasser was liable for the full
value of the coal at the "pit's mouth" (i.e. the value of the coal
after it had been severed and brought to the surface).80 The
trespasser was not allowed to deduct his costs from his liability
to the owner.8 This so called "penal rule ' 8 2 was followed in the
11 Id. at 777.
76 Id.
71 Id. at 778, 779.
78 Id.
71 See e.g., Martin v. Porter, 151 Eng. Rep. 149 (1839) (the court held that the
plaintiff is entitled to the same amount of recovery as he would be if a chattel of his had
been converted, rejecting the defendant's contention that such an award unjustly enriched
the plaintiff).
o 151 Eng. Rep. at 149. See also Note, Coal Worked Beyond Boundary Through
Common Error, 69 L.T. 76 (1880); Note, Trespass to Minerals: Measure of Damages, 170
L.T. 487 (1930) (discussing Martin in the context of the development in English law on
the measure of damages).
1, 151 Eng. Rep. at 149, 150. But see Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q.B. 278, II L.J.R. 263
(1862) (the only expense allowed was the cost of transporting the coal from where it was
wrongfully converted to where it was sold).
12 Note, Trespass to Minerals: Measure of Damages, 170 L.T. 487 (1930).
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United States as evidenced by cases like Blaen Avon Coal Co.
v. McCullahs3 in which the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the proper measure of damages, even for cases of innocent
trespass, was the full value of the extracted coal without allow-
ance for production expenses.
84
Over time, commentators recognized the unfairness of the
strict application of such a rule: "Where, as frequently occurs,
minerals are severed and brought to the surface by other than
the owner in genuine ignorance of the trespass, the penal rule
would work injustice." '85 The courts decided that in cases of
innocent trespass the focus should be on compensating the plain-
tiff for the trespass committed against him without the unnec-
essary element of punishment for the trespasser.16 The question
in such cases should be the value of the mineral "to the person
from whose property it is taken. 8' Thus, the innocent - willful
distinction became a critical factor in measuring damages.
B. Willful Trespass
In cases of willful trespass, the measure of damages has
remained the same as it was under the common law penal rule.
88
The owner is entitled to the full value of the mineral after its
extraction without a reduction for the trespasser's production
expenses.8 9 The jurisdictions that have considered willful trespass
cases are "virtually unanimous' ' 9 in the application of this
measure of damages. This rule obviously fully compensates the
plaintiff, but at the same time also contains a "punitive" 9' or
59 Md. 403 (1883).
Id. at 419, 422, 423.
" Note, supra note 82 at 488.
Note, Measure of Damages - Coal Worked Beyond Boundary Through Common
Error, 69 L.T. 76, 77 (1880).
17 Id. See also Livingston v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25 (1880) (an excellent
conceptual discussion of why different measures of damages are called for in cases of
innocent trespass).
88 Compare supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text with infra notes 89-93.
Annotation, Right of Trespasser to Credit for Expenditures in Producing, as
Against his Liability for Value of, Oil or Minerals, 21 A.L.R. 2D 380 (1952) (the annotation
is based on the Kentucky case of Hughett v. Caldwell Co., 230 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1950)).
0 Id. at 391.
" Stiggar, supra note I at R-2.
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"exemplary ' 92 element which serves as a "deterrent to wrong-
doers." 93
Authority exists for awarding additional punitive damages in
willful trespass cases. 94 But at least one jurisdiction has held that
because the measure of damages for willful trespass is punitive
as it is, there is no need to award additional punitive damages. 95
Kentucky's stance on the issue of additional punitive damages is
not entirely clear. From 1928 until 1975, Kentucky was one of
several states96 with statutes providing for multiple damages in
cases of willful trespass. 97 The Kentucky statute was a criminal
statute under which a willful trespasser would be fined up to
$5000 and would "be liable to the owner in damages double the
market value of the coal mined and removed." ' 98 In the statute's
forty-seven year existence, only two reported cases found a
trespasser liable under the statute. 99 Now that the statute has
been repealed, there is no particular authority for a Kentucky
court to make an additional award of punitive damages. One
might argue that a court may, in its discretion, make an award
of additional punitive damages in cases of particularly egregious
behavior by the trespasser as is sometimes possible with other
tort actions. 1°° However, because the measure of damages is
92 Athens and Pomeroy Coal and Land Co. v. Tracey, 153 N.E. 240, 244 (Ohio
1925).
9I Id.
9' See Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1, 2 (1873). See generally 58 C.J.S., MINES
AND MINERALs § 137(g)(3)(b) (1948).
91 Martinez v. De Los Rios, 331 P. 2d 724 (Cal. App. 1958).
9' See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 499 (1935) (a list of states having mineral trespass
statutes is given).
I K.R.S. § 433.270 provided:
Any person who willfully or knowingly mines or removes coal of the value
of twenty dollars ($20.00) or more from the property of another, without
color of title in himself to the coal so mined and removed, shall be fined
not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five thousand ($5000)
and in addition be liable to the owner in damages double the market value
of the coal mined and removed.
The law was enacted by 1928 Ky. Acts 165, approved March 21, 1928 and repealed by
1974 Ky. Acts 406, ch. 336, effective January 1, 1975.
9 See supra note 97.
" Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Anderson Coal Co., 233 F.Supp. 746 (E.D. Ky. 1963);
Sandlin v. Webb, 240 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1951).
"' See e.g., Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1974). The
defendant car dealer sold the plaintiff's car and the personalty therein while the plaintiff
19881
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already punitive, the success of such an argument is doubtful. 0'
C. Innocent Trespass
In cases of innocent trespass, the value to the particular
owner of the mineral taken must be established. 0 2 The majority
of jurisdictions addressing the issue have determined that the
proper measure of damages is the value of the mineral after
extraction less the costs incurred by the trespasser in producing
the mineral. 03 Authorities generally agree that this measure of
damages is fair because it compensates the plaintiff' °4 without
punishing'015 or rewarding the trespasser.' °6 The Kentucky courts
have not followed this majority view. 0 7
Sandy River Channel Coal Co. v. White House Coal Co.,"°s
which presents a classic case of innocent trespass, was the first
Kentucky case to explain how the damages in such cases would
be measured. Sandy River involved a dispute regarding the di-
viding line between the properties of two coal companies. White
House claimed that Sandy River was mining its mineral estate.' °9
Sandy River denied the allegations." 0 White House prevailed in
a suit to quiet title."' White House then sought damages for the
full value of coal taken from its mineral estate by Sandy River
without a reduction for the costs Sandy River had incurred in
producing the coal.12 The lower court awarded White House the
value of the coal when sold less the production costs incurred
was test driving one of the defendant's cars. There was evidence that the defendant did so
in bad faith and punitive damages were awarded because of the egregiousness of the
defendant's actions. Id.
10, See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
Im See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
,03 Annotation, supra note 89 at 384, 385.
,o Id. at 382.
,01 See id. at 385, 386.
0 Id.
See infra notes 108-147 and accompanying text.
101 S.W. 319 (Ky. 1907).
t09 Id.
110 Id.
- Id.; Sandy River Channel Coal Co. v. White House Channel Coal Co., 72 S.W.
298 (Ky. 1903).
"1 101 S.W. at 320.
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by Sandy River. " ' Both parties appealed. " 4 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals (then Kentucky's highest court) held that "the meas-
ure of damages is the value of the coal or ore as it was in the
mine before it was disturbed. . . .This valuation may also be
expressed as the usual royalty paid for the right of mining"
(citations omitted)." ' The court pointed out "that damages in
cases of innocent mistake must be confined to compensation for
the injury done." 1 6 Further, "all that the plaintiff can fairly
ask is that it be made whole." 117 In this case, the only way to
get to the coal converted was through the trespasser's mine
opening; therefore, the plaintiff was entitled only to a "reason-
able royalty.""11 8 To hold otherwise, the court felt, would be to
unjustly enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the trespasser. 1 9
Thus began a long line of cases, continuing to the present day,
holding that the proper measure of damages is the royalty that
the mineral owner might have received.'
20
An exception to the rule was created by two important cases,
one in the oil and gas context and one in the solid minerals
context. In Swiss Oil v. Hupp,121 the plaintiff, a lessee under a
valid oil lease, sought recovery for the trespass of a lessee under
an invalid oil lease. 2 2 The Hupp court, after holding that the
trespass was innocent,' 23 recognized that the plaintiff, a lessee,
was in a position to extract the minerals and thereby garner any
profit to be made.12 4 The court believed that in such circum-








1a See e.g., Kycoga Land Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 110 F.2d 894 (6th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 688; Holloway v. Kruger, 682 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1984); North
East Coal Co. v. Blevins, 277 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1955); Roberta Coal Co. v. Rudd, 258
S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1953); Ashurst v. Cooper's Adm'rs, 291 S.W. 730 (Ky. 1927); Middle
Creek Coal Co. v. Harris, 290 S.W. 468 (Ky. 1927); North Jellico Coal Co. v. Helton,
219 S.W. 185 (Ky. 1920); Burke Hollow Coal Co. v. Lawson, 151 S.W. 657 (Ky. 1912).
1- 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
22 Id. at 1033, 1039.
Id. at 1042, 1043.
,2 Id. at 1044.
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did not adequately compensate the lessee for his loss. 25 The
court held that the lessee should receive the market value of the
minerals taken less the production costs.
126
In Hughett v. Caldwell County, 127 the court clarified the
application of the exception to the royalty rule first announced
in Hupp.12 In Hughett, there had been a long battle between
the parties concerning who owned the mineral rights in a strip
of land. 129 The trespasser won one round of the litigation over
title and proceeded to mine for fluorspar.' a0 Later, it was deter-
mined that he did not have title,' 3 ' and the true owners, also in
the business of mining, sued for trespass. 13 2 The Hughett court's
discussion of what constitutes an innocent trespass leads to the
conclusion that this trespass was innocent,' and the Hughett
court so held. 34 As to the measure of damages, the court cited
Hupp'35 and held that in cases where both parties are in a
position to mine, royalty is not the proper measure of damages.
Rather, the plaintiff should recover the market value of the
mineral less the production costs. 3 6 The court reasoned that if
compensation is the goal a recovery should be based on, then
mere royalty cannot be adequate in the circumstances of this
case:
In any case of innocence of the trespass, the owner of the
minerals, whether in fee simple or under a mining lease, is in
effect compelled by operation of law to execute a retroactive
lease to the trespasser, though he may be ever so adverse to
doing so, to him or to anybody else. Where one is in a position
to mine his own mineral, he has lost more than that. He has
lost the right to mine it himself. One ought not to be deprived
I ld. at 1043, 1044.
Id. at 1044.
230 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1950).
,z' See supra notes 121-126 and accompanying text.




133 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
1 230 S.W.2d at 94.
Id. at 94, 95.
I36 d. at 97.
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of the right of developing and getting out his own mineral and
of reaping the profit himself, and the trespasser ought not to
be allowed unjust enrichment. Royalty is a matter of contract
- not of damages for tort.'37
The Hughett court overruled cases contrary to the rule stated
above. 3 However, cases like Sandy River where the plaintiff
was not in a position to mine his own minerals were apparently
left standing. 13 9
One commentator at the time of the Hughett'4° decision
expressed his hope that Hughett would lead to a total abandon-
ment of the royalty theory:
Whether a landowner whose minerals have been converted by
a trespasser is in a position to mine them himself, or has no
present feasible way of mining them should make no differ-
ence. In either case he has been damaged to the same extent-
he has been deprived of the right to receive the profits from
his minerals. In either case the converter is a wrongdoer of the
same nature. Why should he be permitted to retain the profits
from his own wrongful acts to the detriment of the one wronged
simply because the landowner is in no position to remove his
own minerals? It is submitted that this violates well established
legal principles; that originally the royalty test for ascertaining
damages for the innocent conversion of minerals was based on
reasons of expediency rather than justice; that justice, not
expediency, should be the controlling factor; and that in all
cases of conversion of minerals, justice can be done only by
giving to the owner the profits from the minerals. It is hoped
that when an appropriate case arises the Kentucky Court will
go the whole way and apply the test for fixing damages used
in [Hughett] to all conversions of minerals by innocent tres-
pass, regardless of whether or not the owner is in a position
to mine the minerals himself.'
4'
,17 Id. at 95, 96.
"I Id. at 97. See e.g., Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 262 S.W. 300
(Ky. 1924).
230 S.W.2d at 97; see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
230 S.W.2d at 92 (Ky. 1950).
14 Comment, Hughett v. Caldwell County - Measure of Damages for Innocent
Conversion of Minerals, 39 Ky. L.J. 236, 238 (1950-51).
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This commentator is certainly not alone in his criticism of
the royalty measure of damages. Some of the most learned legal
theorists have found themselves at a loss to justify the rule.
142
Perhaps the strongest denunciation of the royalty measure was
expressed as follows:
Where recovery is limited to the reasonable royalty value of
the property converted, the wrong-doer, though innocent, is
actually profiting by his wrong in that he not only deducts the
expenses of production but has sufficient allowances remaining
to realize a profit therefrom. This is a violation of all estab-
lished legal principles and the arguments of the courts in
sustaining such a legal monstrosity seem founded on reasons
of expediency rather than principles of justice.
43
Despite the criticism, the Kentucky courts have continued to
apply the royalty theory as the measure of damages; however,
it is a modified version of the royalty theory based on Hupp
and Hughett as evidenced by cases like Roberta v. Rudd,
1
Bowman v. Hubbard,45 and Holloway v. Krugar.146 In cases
where the mineral owners have been deemed not in a position
to mine the minerals themselves, the mineral owners have been
relegated to recovery of only the royalty value of the minerals. 1
47
The distinction between an owner who is in a position to
mine the minerals himself and one who is not is questionable in
light of Commonwealth v. Majestic Collieries.148 That case in-
volved liability for severance taxes. 149 A lessee coal company,
who had engaged "contract miners" to extract the coal argued
that the company was not liable for the tax because it did not
sever the coal.' 50 The court disagreed, and characterized the coal
company as "taxpayers engaged in severing coal" and therefore,
142 See e.g., DoBBs, REMEDES § 5.2. at 322, 323 (1973); Stiggar, supra note 1 at R-
20.
143 Note, Damages for the Conversion of Minerals, 21 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 201
(1945-46).
" 258 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1953).
10 257 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1953).
- 682 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1984).
,47 See e.g., Northeast Coal Co. v. Blevins, 277 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1955).
1- 594 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979).
149 Id.
Mo Id. at 877, 878.
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liable for the tax.' 5 ' The implication of this case is that all
mineral estate owners are in a position to mine their own min-
erals since, for tax purposes, they are considered to be mining
it themselves even if they hire a mining operation to do the
work.
Additional considerations suggest that the royalty measure
of recovery is not based on sound legal principles. 5 2 The alleged
justification for the royalty theory is that it compensates the
owner without unjustly enriching him at the expense of the
trespasser.'53 The theory's first flaw is that it does not compen-
sate the owner. It may be true that the owner of a mineral estate
in land can generally only expect to execute a lease for which
he receives a mutually agreed upon royalty, but as the Hughett
case points out, there is no contract in a trespass case.'54 The
owner has lost more than what he might have received had he
voluntarily executed a lease allowing removal of the minerals.
The mineral owner has lost the freedom to contract as he chooses.
Is nothing to be said for the owner who wishes to wait until the
mineral he has is at a higher price so that he might bargain for
a better royalty? This is not to mention the possibility that the
owner may eventually be in a position to garner the profit
himself. Is there any reason for not protecting this interest of
the owner?
Second, although the royalty measure of damages does not
unjustly enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the trespasser, as
it was feared would be the case with any other measure of
damages,'55 it does unjustly enrich the trespasser. 5 6 Clearly, in
most trespass cases, the trespasser makes a profit. 5 7 If the Ken-
tucky courts were to apply the Hughett exception to all cases of
15' Id. at 878.
,12 See text accompanying notes 153-58.
' See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
," See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
,16 See Stigger, supra note 1 at R-20. See also Note, Policy Underlying Liability for
Trespass to Land, 5 R. MT. L. REv. 286 (1923-33) (the note's author asserts liability is
based on fault. Where someone is not at fault there is no need to punish him, but at the
same time he should not benefit at the expense of the true owner). Note, supra at 287.
"I See 230 S.W.2d at 95, 96 (the fact that under the royalty theory the trespasser
was receiving the profit instead of the true owner who was also in a position to mine was
the reason for modifying the general royalty rule).
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innocent trespass, there would still not be unjust enrichment at
the expense of the trespasser. The trespasser would retain his
costs, including reasonable compensation. ' Under such a rule,
justice would be done. As between the innocent actual owner
and the innocent trespasser, who should receive the profits? To
ask the question is to answer it. There is no justification for
favoring a tortfeasor over the true owner of the minerals.
Perhaps because of the deplorable state of title in mineral
producing regions and because the production of minerals is
valued so highly, one might argue that the profits should go to
the party who actually labored to remove the minerals. The
contention that the person extracting the mineral should receive
the profit fails to recognize that the true owner has not been
fully compensated. If the profits issue is to be decided in terms
of the allocation of the risk of bad title, how can one justify
penalizing the person who actually had title? In sum, by award-
ing the market value less the cost of production the innocent
trespasser is not harmed and the owner is fully compensated.
Any enrichment by way of profits goes to the most innocent
party.
D. Costs Allowed
Whether the Kentucky courts eventually abandon the royalty
measure of damages or not, it is important to consider what
costs are allowed. In such cases, "innocent trespassers are al-
lowed credit for proper expenditures in extracting the minerals
.... "19 The problem has been that most courts fail to state
precisely what are proper expenditures.'
60
For a period of time the courts in Kentucky adjudicated this
issue on a case by case basis. Rudy v. Ellis1 6' indicates that the
oil and gas trespasser is allowed the expenses related to drilling,
equipping, and operating the wells.' 62 In Swiss Oil v. Hupp,
163
,5 See infra text accompanying note 168; 233 F. at 577.
,$ 394 S.W.2d at 776.
,' See Annotation, supra note 89 at 411. One collection of what costs are allowed
may be found in AM. LAW OF MINING § 203.01 [2][b] (1986).
,-, 236 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1951).
61 Id. at 467.
,63 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
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the court held that general overhead expenses could be recovered
as long as they could be allocated between the costs related to
the trespassing operation and the other expenses of the trespasser
not connected to the trespassing operation.64 However, the Hupp
court concluded that income taxes paid by the trespasser on the
sale of the oil produced could not be allowed as an expense1
65
nor could the counsel fees incurred by the trespasser in defense
of the trespass action.1 66 On remand, the Hughett case squarely
addressed what costs should be allowed.' 67 The court held that
the trespasser was entitled to reasonable compensation for the
work performed in producing the minerals.
6
1
Eventually the Kentucky courts were given some guidance
on the question in Joyce v. Zackary. 69 Joyce established a "test
of allowability."170 The test is "whether the expenses were rea-
sonably calculated to be beneficial and productive'' t7 in the
mining operation. Under that test, the court held that an $8800
expense for waterflooding was allowable, 7 as were an engineer's
fee of $182.83 for services "in making an analysis of the oil
reserve,' 73 the "ad valorem taxes assessed against the lease-
hold,"' 74 and the "cost of drilling [a] dry hole.' ' 75 The expenses
of one of the investors in the trespassing enterprise, who claimed
to be entitled to them in return for his "supervisory services,"
were not allowed.176 The court felt he was merely an observer
watching his investment and that this activity was not "reason-
' Id. at 1045.
165 Id.
-6 Id.
,67 248 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1951).
I" Id. However, the expense incurred by Hughett in paying a neighbor to dewater
the mine was not allowed when in fact the neighbor did not do so. The court explained
that it was "without authority to make the plantiffs pay [the trespasser] for money he lost
fooling with [the neighbor]." Id. at 339.
-- 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968).
,70 Id. at 661.
- Id.
,72 Id. at 661, 662.
"I Jd. at 662.
,74 Id. at 663, 664.
,71 434 S.W.2d at 664.
,16 Id. at 662.
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ably calculated to be beneficial or productive in the operation
of the lease."
177
Other jurisdictions that have addressed the subject are gen-
erally in agreement with the pronouncements of the Kentucky
court. For example, an Oklahoma court' 7 allowed the recovery
of all amounts "expended in the development, equipment, main-
tenance and operation of the lease in question ... [including]
all of the equipment, supplies, tools, lumber and other materi-
als" used to operate the lease. 79 In addition, the court allowed
recovery for the expense of "all labor, drilling and casing.'
8 0
In Clark-Montana Realty Company v. Butte and Superior Cop-
per Co., ' the court held that general expenses could not be
recovered where the trespasser could not clearly demonstrate
that such expenses were increased by his trespassing activities.
1 2
However, one case may conflict with the holding in the Hupp
case regarding which expenses are allowed. In United States v.
Standard Oil,"83 the court allowed the recovery of income taxes,
14
contrary to Hupp."5 Also, Standard Oil allowed the expense of
shutting down the operation at the true owner's request pending
the outcome of the lawsuit.8 6 The holding in Standard Oil may
be anomalous due to the fact that the federal government was
the owner of the mineral rights in question.
8 7
CONCLUSION
The measure of damages in mineral trespass cases depends
upon whether the trespass was innocent or willful. 88 The term
I7 /d.
,T' Zelma Oil Co. v. Nemo Oil Co., 203 P. 203 (Ok. 1921).
Id. at 206.
Io /d.
, 233 F. 547 (D. Mont. 1916), aff'd, 248 F. 609 (9th Cir. 1918), decree aff'd, 249
U.S. 12 (1919).
"I Id. at 577.
183 21 F.Supp. 645 (D. Cal. 1937), aff'd 107 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 654 (1940), reh'g denied, 309 U.S. 697, cert. denied, 309 U.S. 673.
21 F.Supp. at 655.
s5 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
116 21 F.Supp. at 656.
187 See supra notes 165-71, 183.
'l See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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"willful" in this context means that the trespasser knew he did
not have title to the minerals he extracted or was grossly negli-
gent in not discovering that fact. 8 9 The term "innocent" in this
context always implies that the trespasser was acting under color
of title; he thought he owned the minerals he was taking.'90
When the trespass is willful, the courts have determined that
the measure of damages should not only compensate the true
owner but also punish the wrongdoer. 191 This is accomplished
by awarding the owner the market value of the minerals con-
verted without any reduction for the costs the trespasser incurred
in production. 192 Kentucky courts are in agreement with the
courts of other states that have addressed the issue as to this
being the proper measure of damages. 93 There is a possibility
of additional punitive damages, but recovery of such damages
is unlikely.
In cases of innocent trespass, the courts' goal is to compen-
sate the true owner without penalizing the trespasser. ' The
majority of jurisdictions accomplish this by awarding the true
owner the value of the mineral after it has -been removed less
the cost incurred by the trespasser in its production. 19 The
Kentucky courts only follow this rule in cases where the true
owner was himself in a position to presently mine the minerals
taken by the trespasser. 196 In all other cases, the true owner is
entitled only to the royalty he could have received had he exe-
cuted a lease permitting removal of the minerals.197 This royalty
measure of recovery has been sharply criticized because it allows
a tortfeasor to profit from his wrong. 98 It is suggested that the
Kentucky courts give serious consideration to the continuing
validity of the royalty measure of damages. 199 Broadening the
,3' See supra notes 16-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 16-38, 57-78 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
, See supra note 89, text accompanying supra note 90.
," See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 85-87, 116-19 and accompanying text.
' Annotation, supra note 89 at 384, 385.
See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 115-20, 144-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141-43, 156-57 and accompanying text.
'' See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
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Hupp and Hughett exceptions 200 to apply to all cases of innocent
trespass would better serve the policy behind the measure of
damages in mineral trespass cases.
201
Where costs are allowed the trespasser, 20 2 the test for deter-
mining allowability is whether the expense incurred was "rea-
sonably calculated" to be beneficial or productive to the mining
operation. 20 3 Costs that are allowed include overhead expenses
where they can be clearly allocated between the trespassing ac-
tivity and the non-trespassing activity of the trespasser, 204 engi-
neering costs,20 5 exploration expenses, 206 ad valorem taxes, 2 7 and
reasonable compensation for the trespasser's efforts. 208 Income
taxes paid on proceeds from the sale of the minerals are not
allowed.2 09 Counsel fees incurred for litigating the mineral tres-
pass suit are not allowed210 and fees paid to persons who do no
actual work toward making the mine productive are not al-
lowed."'
KELLY MARK EASTON
See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141-43, 153-58 and accompanying text.
0 See Annotation, supra note 89 at 384, 385; supra notes 121-39 and accompanying
text.
2o See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163-64, 181-82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text. But see supra note 184 and accom-
panying text.
.10 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 4:137
